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UKRAINE AND BORDER OF WIDER EUROPE
In several years the European Union (EU) and Ukraine will have a common border. The obviousness of this perspective requires to consider the possible characteristics of the international regime likely to be established should the Central East European (CEE) states join the EU and a consequent postponement of Ukraine's formal integration in the Union happen. The paper focuses on the following questions:
Our basic assumption is that the international regime to be created at the Western border of Ukraine will differ from those existing today between the EU members and official applicants for the accession. The active policy of enlargement being conducted envisages gradual removal of barriers within wider Europe and at the same time strengthening of the outside border, towards which our Western neighbors-prospective EU members are being pushed well in advance.
It is clear that accession of the new EU members will be lengthier than the NATO enlargement. Otherwise the organization will degenerate into an amorphous club of states incapable of carrying out mutual commitments. The EU leaders are mostly afraid of this option as they like the Union to be a new type organization build upon the principles of neither situational nor geopolitical alliances, but as an international community united by a set of stable solidary links and sensitive to delicate technologies of common government.
The current phase of the enlargement features indeterminacy of the mechanism and sequentiality of accession as well as a latent competition of the candidates, especially after the "legalization" of the second wave of accession. A recent public dissatisfaction of the Polish Government with the possible "postponing" negotiation with the countries of the first wave is not just reaction on the deprivation of the privileged status, but also expressing concern with the uncertain procedure and terms of the process of negotiations. Indeed, the EU accession procedure changes every time the union enlarges, while the accession criteria remain invariable. At the same time these criteria may become rather flexible either when the political expediency requires so.
However, now the situation differs considerably from the previous cases of enlargement – to the extent situational "accession" differs from doctrinal "enlargement". During the recent years, the strategy and tactics of the EU enlargement has become a top priority issue of the European security, which is less true even for the issue of NATO enlargement, for instance. Hence, one can assume that the very critical EU enlargement (11 "official" candidates are registered) should be a question of the qualitative change of the European order, an evidence of formal completion of the "transition" of the postcommunist countries plus "strategically important" Turkey. In this regard enlargement of EU and NATO, and unfolding of other forms of European partnership along the East-West line were just landmarks of the postcommunist transformations aimed at the resolution of the current problems of the community through the creation of a multi-level system of mutual commitments – the needed "compatibility test".
As much as ten post-communist countries have managed to pass the test. Countries of the former USSR (except for the Baltic states), former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia) and Albania did not succeed and became outsiders of the European integration. A difference of the outsiders from the prospective members is of middle- and long-term prospects, being carefully analyzed by the European observers, rather than of the current state of the countries. We should stress that the attitude of the core EU states towards the peripheral but perspective CEE states (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia) is improving further, while the strategically important, big Ukraine is officially removed from the integration perspective yet. The reason should be found not in the estimation of the reforms of the 1990s (not much positive can be said about Romanian or Bulgarian reforms), but rather in the pessimism as regards the quality of the political landscape created by Ukrainians and seriousness of the claimed intentions.
Although there are differences in the circumstances that made this or that country joining the club of outsiders, they share similar systemic features precluding them from approaching Europe. Conducting a pro-European course is no longer enough for these countries to join the European community. It is indicative that the pro-Western course of Ukraine and Macedonia or latent or open anti-Western course of Russia and Yugoslavia do not have any considerable influence upon their European chances – they are considered to be equally low. Among the countries, which did not manage to get in the "list of 11", only Croatia has good chances to join the list and leave the club of the outsiders joined rather due to the adventurous policy of the late national leader.
Thus the "transitional" international regime of the 1990s may be changed by the "post-transitional" one having some features of the two previous orders. Characteristic will be the following features:
Probability of suspension of enlargement after accession of the second wave is rather high. The faster is the process of incorporation of the current candidates, the longer will the further pause be. European scientific and analytical literature devoted to the EU enlargement shows there is no interest towards those outside of the list of 11. The interest should not be expected to emerge when the enlargement process materializes. On the contrary, inevitable difficulties of the integration of the new members will make the architects of enlargement consider potential candidates more thoroughly.
Under such conditions it is only the institute of associated membership that can play the role of a shock-absorber necessary for the both parties.
Negotiations on the associated EU membership, to be held individually with every candidate, will have to safeguard the union from the inevitable and likely threats of the enlargement. This mechanism will also be a useful tool for the candidates themselves enabling them to extend considerably the term of adaptation to the European standards of integration (as regards the movement of capitals, labor, change of social structures, etc.). This may become the way to overcome the insurmountable for Ukraine circumstances of creation of the new European border that appear today.
According to European experts, the evolution of the regime of governance and control of the external border is determined by two rather diverse imperatives:
The Schengen agreement features elements of the both imperatives, but with the EU eastward enlargement the role of the second one is increasing. This consequently raises a possibility of the appearance of the "Fort Europe" on the ground of the currently open community undergoing enlargement. The following paradox, which has been noted by other authors, appears from this: the real politics of safeguarding the European Union from the existing or perceived threats approximating to isolationism may diverge with the repeatedly declared strategy of development of the EU as a principally new, maximum open organization striving to be a pattern and trendsetter in 21st century.
The Schengen principles are still subject to fierce discussions among the EU members "suffering" from the continuous inflow of immigrants and cherishing xenophobic attitudes as regards the inevitable massive influx of the greeners from the prospective new EU members. At the same time it is general knowledge that the economy structures of the developed West European states require regular labor power intake, including seasonal one. It is also clear that by attracting the Central European states by the future "opening", the EU leaders are clearly requiring the Eastern borders be "closed" beforehand.
It is obvious that a new subregion is being formed in Central Europe, which will be involved in "big Europe" on the rights of the internal periphery. In the process of incorporation subregional ties within the established CEE region might be broken. In other words, reintegration of the "historically homogeneous" region of the Western + Central Europe might cost disintegration of the Central Eastern Europe. Introduction of the visa regime for citizens of the post-Soviet states by the Czech Republic has become the first step on this path.
A question arises whether such developments correspond to national interests of influential and other actors of the European political scene.
Indeed, there is an increasing manpower export from the post-Soviet states, including illegal, but the number of Ukrainian free lance workers in Poland or the Czech Republic for instance does not exceed the number of Polish or Czech workers in Germany. Probably the very modest requirements of the "Eastern guests" as regards the payment and working conditions harm images of the post-Soviet nations. At the same time the corresponding niche of the mentioned countries' labor-markets exists objectively and needs to be filled. Identification of the eastern worker-migrants with criminals originates from the specific ways of behavior of the Russian-speaking mafia, which consider all the concentration points of these non-protected groups its sphere of influence and exploit lack of legal knowledge and discrimination of the Central European non-residents. Principle changes of the law enforcement policies in the CEE region would contribute to considerable decrease of the risks dealing with the issue. However, the current state of the problem in the conditions of the declared fast EU enlargement and the corresponding strengthening of the external border causes division of the East European region and creation of a "velvet curtain".
The above mentioned imperatives of the European "border policy" should be perceived in Ukraine not as an anti-Ukrainian collusion but as a systemized prompting which may help convey the logic of EU European policy, and formulate a corresponding Ukraine's long-term strategy, and define the first priority steps under the given circumstances.
First of all, the logic of the common market (1st imperative) makes creation of closed economies in the age of globalization impossible in the elite and peripheral regions alike. Regime of an integrated market does not need establishment of any strict border. Main protection mechanism required by such market deals mainly with anti-dumping measures both at goods and technologies markets as well as labor-market. Ukraine is still a serious source of varied dumping, which causes latent opposition to the opening of Ukraine's market (border) on the part of the high-cost and socially-oriented European markets. This is especially true as all the problems of the first-wave enlargement are still to be defined.
A gradual establishment of European rules of the game in the Ukrainian economy will be interpreted as a signal of advancement in the corresponding direction. Nevertheless, a "velvet" border will exist unless and until there is a feeling of mutual threat of the two dissimilar enough economic environments.
Then, an important factor of Europe's shutting off Ukraine is an acutely realized threat of inflow of migrants from Europe's peripheries. It is a question not even of Ukrainians but rather of the masses of transit job and asylum seekers going westward. Thus, the main problem of Ukraine's south-western border is its north-eastern one, or rather de facto absence of this border. Actually one can hardly speak of a border, which lacks not just demarcation but partly even delimitation. The Ukraine-Russia and Ukraine-Belarus border exists only in the form of rather corrupted customs, present only on the official thruways. No surprise that the number of illegal migrants being detained at the western border – in the Transcarpathia and Lviv districts – increases annually.
Ukraine will have to establish its north-eastern border. Probably it will be necessary to study all the experience of managing "velvet" borders in order to choose a variant of protection that would suit our Western partners, allow at least to maintain the existing level of Ukraine-Russia trade, and generally would not provoke local population. The "barbed wire syndrome" is typically post-Soviet one and quite incomprehensible for Western experts. Finally, it is in the best Russia's and Belarus' interests to set the strict border.
The problem of illegal migration is a threat to national security of Ukraine no less than it is for Western Europe. Moreover, for Ukraine it is not just a social threat but a threat to foreign policy of the country as well, because it restrains Ukraine's participation in the European integration processes. Establishment of Ukraine's north-eastern border will not solve all its communication problems with the West, but surely deprive adherents of Ukraine's isolation of a good deal of rational motivation.
The factor of economic heterogeneity is an obvious obstacle to integration process all over the world. Failure of the Ukrainian reforms of the 1990s defined Ukraine's lagging behind Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. At the same time Ukraine is by no means an outsider in comparison with Romania or Bulgaria. Hence not just the well-known internal factors, common for the most post-soviet states, but also ambivalence of the integration strategy and tactics of the leading European states. In spite of the prevailing doctrine of "Europe without dividing lines", the essence of the European integration policy is still elitist-particularistic. It can be said that the current policy of EU enlargement constitutes an attempt to reconcile the expansionist impulse (through accession of new members) with the "safeguarding" isolationist one (through strengthening of the eastern border).
Despite all the "demonstrativeness" of the European integration policy, its evolution towards the confident enlargement is precluded by the well-known historic stereotypes. Historical essence of the European integration defines its motivational linkage to two external – as regards the European core – factors: a) the rise of the Communist system (the Cold War); b) the fall of the Communist system. Recurrence of the conflict Russia-West, which has lately become a common practice again, is further strengthening intentions of the Europeans to "entranche themselves" in Central Europe and postpone for an indefinite term the integration of at least some European post-soviet states (except the Baltic states).
The Ukrainian problem, which once existed in the context of extension of the Russian (Polish, Austrian) border, arises today as a problem of setting the European border. The border status of the nation established in the course of centuries, resulted in the formation of a set of complexes and stereotypes which can be traced, in particular, in foreign policy of the country. The concept of "multi-vector foreign policy", formulated by the typically Ukrainian political environment, actually presents strategic threat, as a possible defeat of the inconsistently implemented "European project" of Ukraine in the present geopolitical configurations would mean a final historical defeat of Ukraine as a political unit.
As of today, there are no real grounds to hope that the "velvet curtain" being built at the western border of Ukraine will not be actually built. Disintegration of the CEE region of the 1990s is an actual fact which will inevitably influence the formal communication procedures. However, this will not mean the definitive status quo. Inclination of the Europeans for the unhurried progress and compromise decisions gives time and allows additional space for maneuver. Now Ukraine's failure can be attributed to the unfavorable situation, which means that Ukraine (as well as Croatia, for example) will have another chance. Accession of the eleven declared candidates to the EU will seemingly place Ukraine among the first-line candidates. However, the enlargement process may be stopped should the difficulties of incorporation of weak economies of the new EU members, especially those of South Eastern Europe, appear to be critical. Whether the "velvet curtain" will turn into the iron one depends not only upon Ukraine alone.