Васильченко Олена Анатоліївна
GUUAM AND THIRD VECTOR OF GEOPOLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OF UKRAINE
Upon receiving state independence Ukraine faced the necessity to determine its geopolitical place in Europe. The peculiarity of Ukraine's geopolitical location consists in the fact that it is situated on the boundary between the European and Eurasian civilizations, that complicates solution of the problem of its geopolitical option and calls forth the so-called multivectorial foreign policy of Ukraine. The fact that the Ukrainian foreign policy is multivectorial is an attempt to avoid solution of geopolitical dilemma along the line of East-West under impossibility to realize vital interests on a specific geopolitical vector. Such vector should ensure the solution of three tasks vital for Ukraine: access to energy resources; entry into profitable commodity and capital markets; development of favourable foreign political environment. Each of these tasks was of different priority at various stages of existence of independent Ukraine.
In the period of Leonid Kravchuk presidency, the Ukrainian policy was defined as a policy of a "civilized divorce with Russia", which addressed the issues of division of property, nuclear disarmament, division of the Black Sea Fleet, etc. The main attention was devoted to security issues. However, the problems of energy resources and sales markets for Ukrainian goods emerged soon. In addition, Russia began to utilize Ukraine's dependence on the Russian markets and energy resources as a factor of pressure to realize its political interests.
The period of Leonid Kuchma presidency is characterized by accentuating the two of the three above-mentioned tasks. L.Kuchma waged his 1994 election campaign under the slogan of integration with Russia. The interests of Kuchma's political milieu were connected with Russian energy resources as well as with military-industrial cooperation with Russia. However, on coming to power, Leonid Kuchma had to take due account of the western vector of Ukraine's policy orientation. There were several reasons for that. Firstly, Russia continued to make use of Ukraine's economic dependence as a means of political pressure. Secondly, entry of Ukrainian and Russian producers to world markets made them competitors rather than cooperators. Competition between Ukraine and Russia at the global markets was especially strong in steel products, tank-building and rocket production. Thirdly, insolvency of Russian customers and high level of barter trade in the economic relationship impeded receipt of payments by the state treasury of Ukraine. Barter-based settlements only contributed to increasing the amount of Ukraine's external debt to Russia. Fourthly, conditions of international competition made the Ukrainian producers face the necessity to renew production technologies which western partners predominantly possessed. Fifthly, namely Western financial and banking institutions became creditors of Ukraine.
The problem of political option of Ukraine is rather significant. The Constitution of Ukraine lays the model of development of the country as a state based on the European democratic values and socially oriented market economy. The crisis in Russia consolidated pro-Western orientation of Ukraine. The strategic goal of Ukraine is the course towards the European integration and accession to the European and Euro-Atlantic security structures. Prospective objectives of Ukraine are associated membership in the European Union to be further developed into a full-fledged membership in EU. However, the country is facing serious difficulties along the way to these objectives.
For Ukraine, the problems of its accession to EU are primarily connected with the internal political situation. Although Ukraine signed and ratified the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with EU and approved the strategy of Ukraine's integration into EU, such integration does not serve as a uniting idea for the Ukrainian political elite and Ukrainian society at present. Declaring EU membership as its goal Ukraine continues to be oriented at the CIS countries, in particular Russia. In addition, a certain part of the Ukrainian elite is interested in preserving a state debt to Russia and Ukraine's exclusive dependence on Russia, because the shadow economy makes it possible to make essential profits in that part of the Ukrainian and Russian political clans which control trade in energy resources. Nonconformity of the Ukrainian legal basis to the European standards as well as inappropriate conditions for western investors considerably complicate Ukraine's accession to the European structures.
Ukraine's movement towards Europe is also restrained by different geopolitical orientation of its eastern (at Russia), western and central (at Europe) regions. The pro-Russian attitude and communist ideological mythologems are the motive forces of Eastern, Eurasian orientations in the eastern industrial regions of Ukraine.
At the same time, aggravation of the economic situation leads to increased influence of communist forces, that enabled their success at the parliamentary elections in 1998. Although the communists in the Supreme Rada do not have a constitutional majority, they can still impede the realization of the chosen foreign political course of the country. In the field of foreign policy it could mean renouncing the orientation at the European integration and, under certain conditions (the worst scenario) - turning Ukraine into a sort of a Russian protectorate.
In Ukraine, the process of integration with Russia is encouraged by the political forces oriented at the past rather than the future. In every way possible they are trying to renew confrontation of Ukraine and Russia with the West, exploiting contradictions that have emerged between Russia and USA and Western countries, thus encouraging Russia's imperial geopolitical ambitions.
Therefore, the obstacles on the road towards EU and NATO, on the one hand, and unacceptability of military and political integration with Russia, on the other hand, compel the Ukrainian leadership to search for new approaches to integration and determination of Ukraine's role in the post-soviet space. Such an approach can be orientation at subregional integration using advantages of Ukraine's geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic position, and taking into consideration both western and Russian interests. Consequently, Ukraine is facing the task of reorienting the priority of its national interests from the Eurasian region, or the so-called post-soviet space, to the Black Sea region, with search for allies in the latter. In this context, Ukraine will direct its policy, first of all, to the Black Sea region as a region of Europe which is potentially promising and the one where Ukraine is physically located.
The geopolitical and geostrategic significance of the Black Sea region consists in the fact that it is situated on the crossing of the vertical axis of transport and communications links between the region of Northern Europe and countries of the Mediterranean and Middle East, and horizontal axis that connects two global geopolitical centres, two civilizations, i.e. Europe and Asia. These links used to determine civilizational developments of the Black Sea countries, including Ukraine. That is why, it is not incidentally that Ukraine regards the Black Sea region and Caucasus as the regions of its strategic priorities in the post-soviet area. The realization of these interests is embodied in establishing a geopolitical structure along the line of Kyiv-Kishinev and Kyiv-Tbilici-Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan, known as GUUAM.
Cooperation in the framework of GUUAM is not directed against third countries or groups of countries. Nevertheless, it causes evident concern in the Russian Federation. GUUAM is to consolidate versatile cooperation and interaction in the framework of international organizations and fora, as well as interaction in the framework of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO's Partnership for Peace. Proceeding from that, the Presidents of the GUUAM countries, at their latest meeting in Washington in April 1999, expressed their intention to enhance cooperation in the field of peaceful settlement of conflicts and crises on the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of internationally recognized frontiers, and independence of states. The GUUAM member-states will take joint efforts to combat ethnic intolerance, separatism, religious extremism and terrorism, to carry out effective joint actions to consolidate non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and to prevent weapons supplies to conflict areas. The Presidents also agreed to hold permanent consultations on issues of mutual concern.
However, viability of GUUAM will depend upon the extent of its success in entering the new geopolitical configuration of the region. At the moment, there is a process of restructuring the Black Sea geopolitical space, taking place as a result of drastic change in the balance of forces in the Black Sea region. This process is characterized by the gradual loss of geopolitical and geostrategic domination in the Black Sea region by Russia and increasing influence of the new actors, first of all, Turkey, EU countries and USA. This, in its turn, entails counteraction on the part of Russia. Such counteraction is only natural, since loosing the geopolitical domination by Russia restricts opportunities for realization of its economic as well as military and political interests.
As for Russia, its policy in the Caucasus has been reduced to minimum and consists in at least preserving the still remaining positions and preparing conditions for future expansion. Such policy implies active search for allies in the Caucasus, with neutralization of potential rivals at the same time. Objectively, Russia's geopolitical and military and political allies can include countries whose interests clash with those of the European countries, USA and some countries of the Black Sea region. In this context, Armenia and Iran are the first ones to be regarded as potential allies of Russia.
Armenia demonstrates the largest attachment to allied relationship with Russia. Such relationship is based on reciprocal interests of Russia and Armenia in the Caucasus. For Russia, this interest is connected, first of all, with expanding its military and political influence, while Armenia makes use of Russia to realize its regional ambitions.
According to Armenian experts, 1980s saw the beginning of crystallization of the national ethnocracy. This process has lead to turning Armenia into an ethnocratic country with certain expansionist claims on the territories of compact residence of Armenians in the Caucasus. Such policy envisages placing the state territory under the ethnic one and vice versa. The example of this is Nagorny Karabakh which Armenians consider to be a part of Armenia regardless of the fact whether this will be recognized de jure or not. Armenia promotes setting apart the districts of compact residence of Armenians in the territory of Georgia, and considers Abkhazia to be a bicommunal country of Armenians and Abkhazians.
On the other hand, Russia counts on the Western support of its policy in the Caucasus as well as its military presence, accentuating attention on its exclusive right to settle conflicts.
At the same time, there are two powerful factors rapidly decreasing the Russian influence upon the Caucasian region.
The first factor relates to the independent policy of Georgia and Azerbaijan. In this context, both Russia and Armenia accept establishing of GUUAM rather "oversensitively". Turning this structure into a political organization can isolate Russia not only from Armenia but from the entire Caucasus, as it is Georgia and Azerbaijan that occupy the central geopolitical place in the entire Caucasian region.
The second factor is the internal disintegration of Russia. The greatest disintegrating factor in the Northern Caucasus is Chechnya. In fact, Chechnya has ceased to be a subject of the Russian Federation and, at the same time, it remains to be unrecognized as a state. Russia, on the one hand, cannot recognize independence of Chechnya, but, on the other hand, it is unable to grant Chechnya some other status, for instance, at the level of equal subjects of the Union. In this regard, establishing the Belarusian-Russian Union would be favourable for Chechnya. Its leaders have repeatedly stated their intention to get involved into such Union. The Caucasian peoples, on their part, are afraid of Chechnya's independence and growing of its influence in the Northern Caucasus.
In view of the situation that has developed in relations between the West and Russia vis-a-vis the Black Sea region and Caucasus, Ukraine could create a balance of forces that would ensure stability in the region. And in this sense, GUUAM can be considered a success.