Васильченко Олена Анатоліївна
PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION OF ROMANIA, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE INTO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The common aim of the foreign policies of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, three neighboring countries, is to join the European security architecture. This policy is realized by the countries against the background of different internal and external conditions of integration. All these countries have different ways to integrate into the European organizations, such as NATO or the European Union, not only different conditions.
Only Romania of the three countries in the region has necessary and sufficient conditions for the integration into the European structures by joining them directly. European integration became a priority of its foreign policy. The Romanian society shares the consent, and the political elite of Romania is unanimous concerning the European vector of integration. The Romanian government has political will and takes drastic steps to join EU and NATO. Ukraine and Moldova, in contrast to Romania, do not have such political conditions. They differ from Romania in that they are within the sphere of Russia's influence for the time being. This influence has become apparent in the following key trends.
On the other hand, such an uncertain position of Moldova and Ukraine gives a serious cause for the West to doubt the expediency of their enlistment to the European community and their future acceptance to EU and NATO.
Prospects of Ukraine and Moldova in joining the European-Atlantic security structures have become even more uncertain when Russia began its policy of regional geopolitical competition with the West. Russian resistance to the NATO enlargement is being supplemented with the strengthening of its policy of pressure upon the CIS countries which it regards within the sphere of Russian vital interests.
Therefore, these countries may turn into a "buffer zone" at best, or may be forced to become military and political satellites of Russia at worst. The situation which is forming in Europe and in its eastern region requires the shaping of a new cooperative Ukrainian and Moldovan policy towards their integration in European structures.
Ukrainian strategy of integration into Europe, the so called 'bridge' strategy which was developing actively during 1992-1997, did not pay for itself. Ukraine cannot be considered a 'bridge' between the West and Russia because it still remains under Russia's influence itself. Moreover, there is no consent concerning the European integration in the Ukrainian society. The differences in dominating geopolitical orientation between the population of the western and eastern regions are still there. It contributes to the instability in Ukraine, to the uncertainty and 'multivectorness' of its foreign and military and political course.
The 'bridge' strategy within the context of European integration can be productive only for Romania towards Moldova. After a period of rapprochement between Moldova and Romania on the wave of nationalism - and the Transdniestrian conflict was one of the reasons for this – the integration process between the two countries is gathering speed again. However, in contrast to the period of 1991-1995, this process is going on against the background of European integration.
The experience of the post-Soviet developments naturally makes the Moldovan political establishment understand that there is no alternative to the European and European-Atlantic integration for a future Moldova as an independent and sovereign state. And the Moldovan political elite sees Romania as a 'bridge' to Europe.
However, in order to make the process of integration into Europe irreversible, like in the case of the Central European and Baltic states and Romania, Moldova has to solve two strategically important problems.
It is impossible for Moldova to solve these problems without the Ukrainian support.
These two unsettled issues make the Moldovan political establishment feel its weakness, give rise to inferiority complex and paralyze its political will. All these give rise to disbelief of the possibility of existence of independent and sovereign Moldovan state in the Moldovan society. This public mood leads to the polarization of the society and strengthening of radical ideas defending either a program of reunification with Romania or returning back to the USSR or the creation of a single CIS-based state.
Thus, a public opinion poll of 1997 revealed that 35.3 per cent of the pollees would support the unification of Moldova with the Union of Russia and Belarus, and 47.5 per cent of the pollees were in favor of the union treaty between Belarus and Russia. This support is motivated by the shared expectations of the Moldovans that such a union would assist their country to survive the economic crisis.
Therefore, the Moldovan leadership and political establishment link their course towards the strengthening of the Republic's sovereignty with the establishment of close and allied relations with Ukraine and Romania. The majority of the Moldovan population shares the same convictions. 53.7 per cent of the population are convinced that it is Ukraine that Moldova should develop its allied relations with; those who support the same relations with Romania run to 51 per cent. However, Romania has the highest rate of popularity - it is 0.72 (Ukraine occupies the second place, it has just 0.60). The highest rate of popularity of Romania in Moldova has been determined by the clearly defined Europe-oriented course of the former, not only the ethnic kinship and common historical heritage of the two peoples.
The course towards the allied relations with Ukraine is motivated by the expectations that Ukraine could be instrumental in resolving the Transdniestrian conflict and would help Moldova leave the sphere of the Russian influence.
The role of Ukraine in the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict is determined by relatively high potential of its peacemaking policy in the region and by the interests the Transdniester Moldovan Republic (or the PMR - Prydnistrovska Moldavska Respublica) and Moldova have to their eastern neighbor.
Transdniestria considers Ukraine as its ally in its struggle against the Romanian influence in Moldova as well as an alternative to the Russian influence in Transdniestria and a strong Russian involvement in the negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol. A statement of PMR President Igor Smirnov, made in spring 1997, that it is possible that Transdniestria would join Ukraine revealed a heightened attention of the PMR to Ukraine.
Moldova in its discussion with Transdniestria also appeals to Ukraine as to the most impartial arbitrator. The Moldovan leadership seeks Ukrainian assistance in neutralizing the Russian influence on Transdniestria and in convincing Tiraspol that its one-sided orientation towards Russia and joining various Russian unions could lead to the confrontation with Ukraine.
Despite the common aim of European integration, Romania, on the one hand, and Ukraine and Moldova, on the other, have different conditions and possibilities for its realization. Therefore, Ukraine and Moldova have to base their policies of integration into the European security architecture on the common conditions and possibilities within the framework of a certain regional structure. The most acceptable form of such a cooperation is to develop their relations and to improve their cooperation within the GUUAM.
The advantage of GUUAM cooperation is that this association allows its member-states to take into account their individual military, military and political, and military and technical interests and use their national resources better. The prospects of the GUUAM will be determined by these common interests and potential resources of its individual member-countries. The following common interests and basic aims of the GUUAM countries can be taken into account:
First, integration of common efforts and coordination of the states' policies to join European security structures. In this respect, the GUUAM is similar to the Vishegrad group of the Central European countries. Obviously, the main purpose of this group has been the unification of mutual efforts of its members to join the EU and NATO.
Second, realization of common security policy beyond the CIS. Such a policy could make it easier for the countries to resist the Russian pressure and to ensure their national security interests within the post-soviet space. Naturally, the creation of the GUUAM was initiated in Vienna and based on the common position which began to take shape during the negotiations on the adopted Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova found themselves within the "flank zone" of this document. And during the meeting of the Common Consultative Group in Vienna on April 8, 1997, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova presented their common Statement which emphasized inadmissibility for Russia to deploy its weapons and military equipment, that could be entitled and limited by the Treaty, within the "flank zone" without the appropriate bilateral agreements.
It is generally known that the GUUAM countries are not members of the CIS Common Security System. As this system failed to be effective, the GUUAM countries would work out their security problems within the framework of this new-made structure.
These problems include, first of all, the settlement of conflicts in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Ukraine has already sent its military observers who have the UN/OSCE mandates to these conflict areas. It is also important to point out that Ukraine has enough potential to undertake a role of peacekeeper in the European part of the post-Soviet area. First, Ukraine's geopolitical situation allows it to take account of political, climatic, socio-economic, and ethno-cultural features and peculiarities of the eastern European region to the full extent. Secondly, Ukraine has training centers and structures, appropriate potential and resources to prepare and carry out peacekeeping operations. A coordinating center of peacekeeping operations was set up at the Defense Ministry of Ukraine. A decision to establish a special training center for peacekeeping troops was also taken. Thirdly, Ukraine's own interests as a neutral country coincide to a great extent with the interests of supporting peace and stability in the eastern European and Black Sea regions. As for the principles of peacekeeping activities, Ukraine is ready to provide its contingents for the peacekeeping operations on condition that these operations are conducted under the auspices of the UN/OSCE and the peacekeeping troops are multinational and placed under the command of the international general headquarters. Regarding the clearly defined forms of realization of Ukraine's peacekeeping activities, they will be various taking into account the features of each individual conflict. Thus, it is obvious that Ukrainian peacekeeping activity in Nagorno-Karabakh would be limited to mediation and facilitation, including military observation. Azerbaijan can expect every possible support in the renewal of its territorial integrity on the international level. The Ukrainian peacekeeping potential in Georgia is broader. Georgia has asked Ukraine repeatedly to bring its peacekeeping contingent into the conflict zone. A proposal to set up a joint Georgian-Azerbaijan-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion is working out. The parties have already reached preliminary consent concerning its establishment. Ukraine is ready to provide its contingent to manage the conflict in Abkhazia. An important security problem for these countries is also the development of the regimes of nonproliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons as well as the prevention of arms deliveries to the conflict areas.
A mutual security goal for the GUUAM countries should be a coordinated policy towards elimination of Russian military presence on their territories.
Thirdly, a common military and political and military and economic interest for the GUUAM countries is to ensure security of the functioning of the Transcaucasian oil corridor.
Ukraine is interested in natural gas and oil. A gas pipeline route suggested by Russia makes Turkmen and Uzbek gas uncompetitive on the Ukrainian market. This makes the partners seek other solutions, as Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma noted. According to him, the GUUAM emerged as a means to obtain energy sources cheaper and by a short cut from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia as well as to deliver goods cheaper because the transportation rates through the Russian territory make them uncompetitive. "Thanks God we created this transport corridor and a train ferry. We reaped the harvest of 1999 thanks to the Caspian oil", President Kuchma said.
Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov holds it that the GUUAM serves as an efficient solution to the transport problems of the countries which constituted the consultative body. Uzbekistan, according to him, is involved in the construction of a highway which will run across Kyrgyzstan to China. It is also involved in shipping cotton via Iranian ports and the Georgian port of Poti. "We completely support the projects to create alternative transport ways, in particular within the GUUAM area, because we can see this is a basis to improve the economy of our country", President Karimov explained.
As Moldovan leader Petru Luchinschi noted, the GUUAM countries united to solve quickly their economic problems connected with the new oil and gas transport corridor building. He pointed out that other Commonwealth states, including Russia, are also involved in the similar regional associations. Luchinschi referred to the so-called "Shanghai Five" as an example. According to him, "we should welcome" such associations. "Aimed at creation by the end of the 20th century, this process is becoming irreversible", Moldovan leader said.
The GUUAM member states, i.e. Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, are involved actively in the implementation of the unique European project on the revival of the Great Silk Route. In this respect, the interests of the GUUAM countries coincide completely with those of EU and NATO countries. That is why the establishment and strengthening of the GUUAM can be considered as part of the integration policies of its member-states into the European security architecture.