Âàñèëü÷åíêî Îëåíà Àíàòî볿âíà
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION: EXPERIENCE OF THE REPUBLIC BELARUS
An international seminar "International Integration: experience of the Republic of Belarus" was recently held in Kyiv by The Olof Palme International Center (Sweden) and the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies. Scholars, politicians representing leading bodies of social-democratic parties of their countries, diplomats, journalists from Belarus, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden and Ukraine took part in this seminar. Here we present a brief report on the views expressed by the participants.
There is a potential for some conflicts between the leading influential groups in the Russian Federation and Belarus because they have different political and economic systems, even different value systems.
In future, it is necessary to take into account a possible aggravation of the conflict of interests of various groups of the ruling class and business circles of Russia among themselves regarding the Russian-Belorussian integration. This conflict of interests take place now. A limited, but rather expressive example of it is a conflict concerning the distribution of profits gained from the functioning customs union. There was information in the Russian press concerning the facts that representatives of some Russian elite groups tried to force the Belorussians to share these profits with them. According to this information, the first onslaught from the representatives of the Russian elite was beaten off by the Belorussian politicians and officials. However, this morsel is too tasty to give up hope to get it. It is obvious that there is a second area of discrepancy of interests: the Russian capital which was reared by the elite-oriented privatization would not mind taking the most tasty morsel of the Belorussian economy. In this sense the interests of the Russian largest financial and industrial groups and the Administration of the President of Belarus do not coincide. We can assume that Lukashenko would have to make some concessions as the economy of Belarus, despite the diversification of external ties, depends on Russia to a considerable extent and the Russian financial and industrial groups exert rather appreciable influence on the policy of the Russian government and the Administration of the President. At the same time, we cannot ignore the wish of Russia to attach Belarus to itself as close as possible, to disallow making eventual advances of the Belorussian administration, or maybe a future, post-Lukashenko administration with NATO under existing conditions of NATO expansion toward the east. In this sense the situation Russia-Belarus reminds the situation of absorption of East Germany by West Germany to a certain extent. In both cases, the strongest party has to pay and to pay much enough.
Concerning an eventual purchase of Belarus by Russia, experts have calculated that it would require the investments of no less than DM 100 billion. Russia cannot afford such a sum.
Let us consider the value orientations of the Russian and Belorussian elites. It is obvious that in today's Belarus the fashion is set by the state officials, who suppress, supervise, and control the business in the Republic completely. The situation in Russia is less determined. Confrontation among the financial and industrial groups, between the financial elite and the higher echelons of state officials in Russia seems to be unfinished yet. It is possible to talk about a situation of unstable balance today. Gaidar and Chubais personify a direction towards the financial oligarchy and its domination. Luzhkov, with his possible claims to occupy the post of the President of Russia, personifies a direction towards the domination of state bureaucracy. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin tried to balance these interests. If Luzhkov win the following presidential election, which is quite possible, we can forecast, first, the further rapproachement of Russia and Belarus and, second, eventual trtansfer of the Belorussian model to Russia when we take into account financial, information, administrative possibilities of Russian authorities and Luzhkov's good attitude to President Lukashenko. We can also assume that such a strategy would be supported by the voters when we take into account the sufficient affinity in mentality of ordinary citizens of Belarus and Russia. However, it is just one of the possible scenarios.
Anyway, the question about cooperation or rivalry between Luzhkov or Lebed (in the role of the following president of the Russian Federation) and Lukashenko remains open because all of them are the rivals playing on the same field, though the they share common interests and purposes. They are people aspiring to power, therefore a question can be raised whether they are able to cooperate in general or there can be only one master. Cooperation or integration between Belarus and Russia differ in political and economic dimensions. The political obstacle is not only that there are two strong Presidents. It is obvious that their political agreements on the community, union are declarative. On the other hand, the economic integration is going on. There is another question: Does it promote the development of market capitalism in Russia, is it useful for Russia in general?
Russian policy towards Belarus is very indicative and important, it is an indicator whether Russia strides toward capitalism or makes no headway, being engaged in barter with Belarus. Lukashenko and Belarus influence negatively the development of capitalism and democracy in Russia now.
Belarus is characterized by a lack of national and ethnic self-identification of the population. Partially, the reason of it is because Belarus had been an independent state for a very short period of its history. The Belorussian self-identification is somehow mixed up with the Great Russian identification, that is the Belorussians feel themselves a part of some indivisible entity with Russia.
However, when Lukashenko demonstrated what his activities as a pro-Russian and pro-Slavonic politician meant in practice, he urged many people, first of all youth and intellectuals, towards the Western orientation. Nobody could do so much as Lukashenko to revive the value of the sovereignty and aspiration of the Belorussians to enter Europe.
There is every reason to believe that the self-identification of the Belorussians on the national basis is impossible in the visible future. But it is possible on another basis, the establishment of civil society on the democratic base. It is quite a real prospective, and Lukashenko has contributed greatly to it. Moreover, the period of Lukashenko's rule has been marked with rather sharp growth not only democratic, but also anti-Russian moods. If before 1994, there were few people with such views, today, their number comes to hundreds of thousands, and they include not only the young people and those who live in Minsk, but also those who live in the depths of the country. First of all, the Catholic population living in the western regions of Belarus can be mentioned. The Catholics were turned into a certain marginal group by Lukashenko as he staked on the Orthodoxy as the state religion.
Russia should seriously reflect upon what is more preferable to it: either democratic, predicted state, loyal to Russia, or certain obscure polity with the Ulster-like features within the Russian Federation.
It is absolutely incorrect to draw a parallel between the integration processes in the CIS and the EU. There is no such a dominant in Europe, which would stand above everything, as Russia in the CIS. Interests of the member countries of the CIS are asymmetrical. If something really unites them, it is their dependence on Russia. Lukashenko used integration exclusively as a means to achieve his aims.
Pursuant to the modern practice of application of international law, the countries have much more grounds and opportunities to interfere into the internal affairs of other countries, than they had during the period of the Cold War. It is stipulated in the provisions of the 1989 European Charter and others documents. The European countries have the necessity and possible means to support democratic forces in Belarus, proceeding from the characteristic features of Lukashenko and Lukashism. What is the best way of pressure on Lukashenko: to try to integrate him or to isolate him? Sweden has an experience when it tried to impose a blockade on Greece in time of the "black colonels". It even closed its embassy in Athenes. However, this action was recognized as erroneous when its results had been estimated. It was possible to influence the situation more efficiently with the effective Embassy of Sweden in Greece. To what extent is Lukashenko sensitive to international public opinion? Let's draw a parallel, say, with a case of mister Milosevic. It was a complex game: on the one hand, there were moments when he was isolated, on the other hand, the dialogue was going on.
Today, a priority task of the European Union is to prevent Lukashism from spreading outside Belarus. If it is not understood, it would be a greatest mistake, for it is primary. Lukashenko is very much sensitive to the semi-isolation existing de facto. But in this case nobody puts a question of complete isolation.
A few scenarios of mutual relation of Belarus and the International Community can be considered. The first scenario: Lukashenko and Brussels conclude a certain agreement – Lukashenko receives a pass-ticket to Europe in exchange for some liberalization in political and economic spheres, and the realization of early election in parliament. A version of this scenario can be as follows, when Brussels and Moscow, passing over the official and informal Minsk, conclude a similar agreement between themselves.
The second scenario: Europe freezes its relations with Lukashenkoþ at the present level. How surprising it can be, but Lukashenko would prefer this variant. It is important to him now to focus all his forces and resourc
es in the eastern direction, and he would not like to divert his attention on the problems, which come from the West. For this reason he had opposed so furiously the arrival of the OSCE mission in Minsk.Also there is a third scenario, when Brussels and Washington use their opportunities of positive influence on Moscow and try to influence the situation in Belarus positively by their joint efforts. Certainly, the diplomatic relations with Belarus are kept in this case and certain political contacts should take place as well. Lukashenko should be invited to international conferences, but the Belarus question should be put on the agenda and resolutions on Belarus, rigid enough, as well as recommendations how to improve the situation should be adopted.
Public and economic contacts should be encouraged, but they must be of the so called "dot" character – investments and credits, for example, should be put into the business sector. On March 6, 1998, the U.S. Congress adopted a very rigid resolution on Belarus, which stipulates that if the official Minsk would continue its present policy, President Clinton is advised to reconsider the most favored nation treatment in trade regarding Belarus. Tactically, it is a correct decision because it is bound up with the OSCE mission activities in Belarus.
The economic isolation of Belarus in the conditions of its economic integration with Russia is inefficient. Certainly, it is necessary to keep the existing foreign presence in Belarus. International institutions and foreign embassies should not leave the country until some extreme situation. It will allow to render influence, limited though it may appear, on the political elite of Belarus, to support democratic opposition, to conduct the normal economic and political bargaining, and to promote political education of the population as far as possible. As to opening new embassies, this opportunity should be meant. And it would be possible to consider this matter in practical terms when a relatively acceptable situation is established during the said economic and political bargaining. It could be a response to any appreciable concessions on the part of the Administration of Lukashenko.
There is a number of factors in current post-modernist politics which started after the end of the Cold War as ones which seriously threatened international security. The factor of Belarus and the factor of Lukashenko represent one of the most important among them. We can see the marginal political regime which cannot be automatically treated as rightist, leftist or fascist – it is some kind of the populist regime and the only limitation is that it emerged in the new geopolitical area, in Central Eastern Europe or post-Soviet space. It is a threat to international security and probably a sample for all countries with unstable political democracy. Such form of authoritarian regime may appear not only in Belarus but also in the countries of post-Soviet space and even in several Central Eastern European states as well as in the Third world. Everything may happen, but for some reasons the first candidate is Ukraine. Now Ukraine came most close in position of such populistic non-responsible political authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime. Lukashenko hadn't provide an open coup d'etat, he didn't voluntarily and forcefully amended the Constitution, but he provided the referendum under which he changed the Constitutional law. So, from the point of view of the internal legislation Lukashenko made all the best in order to preserve formal legitimacy of his regime. The Presidential administration in Ukraine almost openly declared intentions to follow the same way.
The phenomena of Lukashenko could be considered and discussed on four levels. The first, zero level is an approach to this phenomena from the point of view of social and philosophical outlook. It is just a new phenomena of the post-modernist political reality. From the strategic level the factor of Lukashenko is quite acceptable for main actors of the European and world politics. It is acceptable for Western Europe: there are some shortcomings and benefits, but the benefits are dominant.
It is absolutely unacceptable in the context of the second level, moral and humanitarian, because Lukashenko's regime absolutely contradicts European and international law and standards of democracy and political freedom, it is a rockstate in Europe and nowadays Belarus cannot participate in the all-European process. In this case it is practically completely unacceptable.
The third level is political level. The events in Belarus don't represent the worse situation for the main political actors, because Lukashenko's regime is not very strong and it doesn't present an open threat for the neighboring countries and for European general security composition. The evolution of Lukashenko's regime is not complete, he is in some cases flexible and in some independent, but in any case the situation in Belarus gives a time-out necessary for very many political actors who were interested in it. It gives an acceptable time-out for Brussels-1 and Brussels-2 and for Moscow and for several other states.
The fourth is the level of diplomacy necessary to take into account that social and philosophical outlook is at a zero level. Considering this phenomena from the diplomatic level we see that the treatment and practical diplomacy towards Belarus is the most complicated and difficult issue for all of main political actors and all neighboring states because it touches their vital interests, their borders, their security interests, etc. The main approach of the dominating political actors at the diplomatic level can be explained as situation of waiting and very careful zondage.
Who is interested in Belarus? It is a very rhetoric question: who needs Belarus? So it must be a very important issue for discussion, is it necessary for Europe, for Western Europe, for Brussels-1 and for Brussels-2, is it vital for the United States? Definitely not. At Budapest in 1994, there were some worries concerning the eventual security guarantees. Memorandum of security ensurances gave them not only to Ukraine but also to Belarus and Kazakhstan. From the other point it was the reserve measure for influence which was not mentioned ever after the appearance of Lukashenko's regime. The diplomatic involvement of the US in this situation must be reminding of Budapest's Belarus Memorandum. It has to be implemented by the parties who had very specific and vital interests in the issue and also by democratic forces and all parties and states which are interested in the restoration of democracy and non-extending of Lukashenko phenomena to other European states. From the point of view of NATO extension discussions on situation in Belarus give some opportunity to NATO because they help to bargain with Russia. In any case discontent with a Russian Federation activity in Belarus is a play card for NATO. It can be used to neutralize Russia's opposition to NATO extension in the Baltic states and NATO's activity in the Balkans as well. From the point of view of Brussels-1, from the European Union's, the attitude to this issue is much more clear. Situation in Belarus for several years will be rather acceptable to the EU headquarters. They are "too busy" to be involved in Belarus because of a number of unsolved problems in the context of preparation to the next stage of extension which is the most difficult in the history of the European Union and time-out in Belarus is helpful for the EU.
The geopolitical approach to the factor of Belarus gives a wonderful deadline to if not negotiable and legal but to geostrategic formation and implementation of results of the West victory in the Cold War. In any case the geopolitical line of European institutions extension is on the border of Belarus. Even after Lukashenko's regime leaving the office away and coming to power of a new regime in this country, Belarus will be treated as a very far candidate for full participation in European institutions because its way towards European standards will be even slower than of the countries which passed the transition period and implemented some modern European standards. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Russia will ever leave Belarus and let it go away from its sphere of influence. Russian public opinion will treat efforts to take Belarus away from the Russian sphere as a new geopolitical failure. It's impossible to find a political leader of Russia who will let Belarus go.
Ukraine is something staying in more distance for the RF. If we analyze not the speeches of Russian politicians but the contents and meaning of their politics, from practical point of view Russian politicians are not eager to take risks in Ukrainian issues. The attitudes in the RF to the issue of Belarus is different. Several countries needs short explanation of their positions. These countries are: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. From the point of view of interests of these countries, situation in Belarus gives some benefits as well as some shortcomings. Poland is going to join NATO and the EU, the situation in Belarus gives the best arguments for its quick and easy inclusion into NATO, EU and other European and Western institutions. Belarus factor serves as a very good argument to be used in this and that situations. Lithuania, from economic point of view, hasn't greet situation in, but from the political and strategic point of view, Lithuania may feel something similar to the Polish government. Probably, Poland now even accepted economic losses because of situation in Belarus and acted very quickly and easily to close the border for the citizens of Belarus. Concerning Ukraine, Administration of the country gives very specific and very few chances for opposition forces to come to power and in some circumstances the executive power may use the Belarus scenario.
Ukraine is rather important, it is not crucial but first class factor for European security. In this sense, Europe has to fulfill its mission to prevent authoritarian dictatorship in Ukraine. During election campaign of 1998, the miracle of Lukashenko strongly appeared in Ukrainian politics. Executive authorities did their best to discredit the power of legislator and made very difficult situation for the parliamentary and local elections in Ukraine. European media has turn more focused attention on such subjects and issues and continue broadcasting in Eastern Europe, especially in Belarus and Ukraine, because since the fall of 1997 such broadcast became among very few alternative and honest sources in the information sphere of these countries.
European involvement in Belarus as well as European involvement in Ukraine and Russia which will be grounded on the Universal Charter for Human Rights and European Law etc., is very necessary and urgent. European democracies must not stop criticism on all events of suppressing democracy in these states aiming more stable and more powerful Europe in the 21st century. It is a crucial issue not only for Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, but also for European values and the European civilization. Concerning Sweden, it is one of very few countries which foreign policy is mostly related to such values and treasures of European democracy and the European civilization. This tradition comes from honorable Olof Palme and is shared practically by all political parties in Sweden, including social democrats, moderates and liberals. As well as Belarus, Ukraine and Russia are members of several European institutions as well as their executive authorities obliged to follow European values and their parliaments ratified sufficient number of conventions, joined a lot of UN declarations, charters etc., reminding and repeating sense of these values. Europe must pay more attention not just to local situation in Belarus, but to open and honest frequent political analyses and judgment of regime and its activities because it contradicts to European values and standards which are to be shared by all countries membering in the OSCE. It will force Russian politicians to take more definite position concerning events in Belarus. In some circumstances several very influential political forces in Russia will start confront Lukashenko himself in order to stabilize the Russian geopolitical influence in Belarus because wise politicians in Russia don't believe Lukashenko. He is one of the means for joining Belarus to Russia, but he is an obstacle for geopolitical domination of Russia in Belarus. In this sense we see unification of trade, customs, military union regime. But it doesn't mean integration. There are some features of economic cooperation between Russia and Belarus, subsidies, loans, semi-concessions on the part of Russia to Belarus, but not integration itself which has to be based on a strong and stable influence of Russia. Europe may play on Russian feelings and on Russian obligations in order to provide civilizing indirect influence upon Belarus