Âàñèëü÷åíêî Îëåíà Àíàòî볿âíà
POLISH-UKRAINIAN CO-OPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE MEMBERSHIP OF POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
By Przemyslaw Zurawski vel Grajewski
Poland and Ukraine are the two largest countries in Central-Eastern Europe with a set of common fundamental interests. Both share a long period of common history and common European culture still their political situation as to the scale of co-operation with the European Union and the perspectives of their respective participation in the process of the European integration differs profoundly. Poland is a candidate state on her way to the full membership in the EU and Ukraine is not in spite of her European Choice pronounced officially at the Luxemburg meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (June 8-9th 1998)[1]. The so-called European Treaty i.e. the treaty of association determines Poland’s relations with the EU while the Ukrainian place in the process of European co-operation was determined by the decisions taken at the EU Helsinki summit (December 10-11th 1999) where the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine was adopted[2]. Both Poland and Ukraine are not satisfied with the present state of affairs. Poland aims at the full membership to be achieved as soon as possible and Ukraine has declared her will to become an associated member state of the European Union. What are therefore the perspectives for both our countries in that field? What will be the impact of the future Polish membership in the EU on Polish-Ukrainian relations? What are the main areas of mutual relations between our two countries that should be considered in the context of European integration?
The answer for all those questions is extremely important not only for our two countries. Ukraine is the largest state of Central-Eastern Europe and Poland is the largest one among those invited to the accession negotiations in the process of the EU enlargement. That situation leads to the conclusion that the relations between our two nations will determine the minimum standards of the relations between future EU member states and those countries that will not enter the Union in the foreseeable future. Saying minimum I do not want to go into the issue of the political good will. I just mean the fact that what will be successfully solved in the Polish-Ukrainian relations due to the scale of both countries will serve as a minimum standard making solutions for other smaller neighbours. Still the vice versa rule is not so obvious (Future Slovenian-Croatian relations will hardly serve as standard making ones since what can be successfully solved in the scale of those two countries may be not necessary applicable as a pattern for the larger states. Just solving problems on the scale of 90 millions of people is much more difficult than doing the same on the scale of ca.6 millions). This brings a special responsibility to our two countries.
Perspectives of Poland’s accession and Ukraine’s association with the EU
First we should realize that the process of Poland’s accession to the EU will be probably not accomplished before the year 2004-2005. There is no room to present a detailed analysis of that problem here. Let me just point out that no money has been foreseen for enlargement in the EU financial perspective for the years 2000-2006
[3] and that the European Treaty expires only in 2004 and till that time by the virtue of that treaty Polish market remains opened for the EU products. Brussels therefore does not need to pay for the related benefits neither in a political nor in an economic way.Ukraine’s aspiration to obtain a merely promise on a possibility of an associated membership of the EU were rejected in Helsinki and we cannot make any valuable estimation as to the possible revitalization of that issue on the EU political agenda. The break through is possible only if any dramatic developments take place in Russia as it happened in 1991 when Polish European Treaty negotiations were assisted effectively by the fear created in Europe by the Yanayev coup d’etat.
The conclusion is that Poland in spite of the official declarations of the Polish government will probably become the EU member state not earlier than in the year 2006 and that we can say nothing about the Ukraine’s perspective for association. We have to face the fact that Poland is hardly wanted in the Union in the next few years and Ukraine is not wanted there at all. Therefore promoting our common interests in Brussels we should avoid any illusions and any unrealistic wishful thinking. We should adopt the strategy based on step-by-step tactics and concentrate on achieving concrete solutions of concrete problems and not on great declarations.
Apart from the remote term of Polish full membership in the European Union and the Ukrainian association with the EU, the accession of Poland to the European Communities will have a profound impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations. To present the main results of that process first we have to name the principle areas that will be affected by the EU enlargement in that context.
The main streams of Polish-Ukrainian relations that should be considered in the prism of Poland’s integration with the EU are:
1. Polish potential influence on the EU decision making process;
2. border control;
3. Polish-Ukrainian co-operation in:
3.1. the political adaptation for the European integration process;
3.2. EU external founds management and consumption;
3.3. the international security area;
3.4. civil servants training in the EU issues;
3.5. educational co-operation (University staff and students exchange).
1. Polish potential influence on the EU decision making process
The EU policy towards Ukraine is shaped without Polish institutional influence now. This will change after Poland’s accession to the Union. Still the entrance of Poland to the European Union will change as well the character of the Polish-Ukrainian relations. They will become more multilateral and less bilateral. It will bring both benefits and loses. It is the task of our two countries to maximalize the first and to minimalize the last. A lot of the issues that are decided in Warsaw and in Kiev now will be decided in Brussels and in Kiev. Still a lot of the decisions that are taken in Brussels now without Polish participation and that have an impact on both Poland and Ukraine, will be taken together with Poland and will be influenced by Warsaw’s point of view.
The decisions on strategic political issues lay within the competence of the European Council still according to the legal system of the EU it is the Council of the European Union where all the practical and legal decisions are taken. The bulk of them are the outcome of the majority voting system. That system is based on the connection between the population of the country and the number of votes at its disposal in the Council however that connection is not a proportional one. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have each 10 votes, while Luxemburg has 2. Poland with her 38 millions of inhabitants is a country of the size of Spain and Spain has 8 votes. There are no other large states among the applicant countries except for Romania (20 millions – possible 6 votes). Consequently Poland entering the Union will join the exclusive club of large states constituted by six main European countries – four Great Powers plus Spain and Poland. This calculation may however be changed by the institutional reform of the European Union. Such a reform is one of the "hot issue" discussed nowadays in Brussels still any changes are possible only in favour of the large states in order to avoid the supremation of small candidate countries which would be inevitable under the present system.
Whatever is the result of the dispute and the future votes pondering system in the Council Polish influence will be the fifth ex aequo with the Spanish one in the Union
[4]. Moreover Warsaw will probably enjoy the possible support from the smaller states of the region shearing common interests with Poland (Baltic states, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania). This will create a new political situation as far as the possibility of the promotion of central-eastern European interests (including Ukrainian ones) is concerned.2. Border Control and the Movement of Labour and Trade
Till January 1998, when Poland introduced new border regime on her eastern frontiers ca. 3.2 millions of the Ukrainians visited our country per year (first of all in a character of "trading tourists"). An average Ukrainian visitor spent ca. 460 USD per day. (For comparison: an average German tourist who is not a trading one spends ca 36 DEM)
[5]. It is obvious that an individual trading activity constitutes even today an important or maybe dominating factor in the mutual Polish-Ukrainian everyday relations.The restrictive regulations introduced on Polish eastern borders at the turn of 1997 and 1998 have already limited transborder movement still they have much greater impact on the situation of the Belarusian and Russian citizens than on the Ukrainian ones. However one should not omit the fact that an average time of queuing for individual passengers of public communication buses at the Polish-Ukrainian border is 2-3 hours and the luggage control by the custom officers is very strict.
Poland and Ukraine have an agreement on non-visa movement of persons. That convention, unlikely the ones with Russia and Belarus, is accompanied with the agreement on readmission of illegal immigrants. Therefore the new border regime on the Polish-Ukrainian border is not so severe.
The limitation of the transborder movement of persons, goods and labour in the Polish-Ukrainian relations is considered by Polish public opinion as undesirable. It is worth mentioning that regardless all the fears and myths on ethnic tension in the post-communist countries neither in Poland nor in Ukraine any violent incidents between visiting Ukrainians and Polish population or vice versa have taken place so far. The economic interest of many Polish families, especially from the poor eastern part of the country demands the development of the transborder trade even in its semilegal forms. In those circumstances the "trading tourists" from Ukraine are welcomed as desirable visitors creating employment in Polish small business
[6]. In spite of those facts this reality will be changed and my thesis is that the change is inevitable.After the collapse of the so-called sistiema on the former Soviet borders Polish eastern frontier is the first one that is really guarded between the Pacific Ocean and the European Union. Poland entering the EU will become a border state of the Union and Polish eastern frontiers will become the Schengen borders. Regardless of the political will of the Polish as well as the Ukrainian political elite and public opinion Poland will not be able to maintain the present liberal rules on our common border. Our country will have to accept the rules of the Schengen agreement. Being outside Schengen area would mean for Poland having a Schengen border with Germany the one that would separate us from the Union. That is a solution for Poland politically unacceptable. Our country is not powerful enough to negotiate successfully with the EU an exclusion of the Polish-Ukrainian border from that regulation. The question of immigration is so acute for the Union that we can hardly expect the European Commission to make any exceptions for new candidates in that field
[7]. Therefore we have to accept that reality however we are not very happy of that. We are aware it would be contrary to the interest of Poland to turn our country into the border checkpoint of the EU exclusively.The situation described above poses a question: What we – the Poles and the Ukrainians can do to minimalize an undesirable impact of the establishment of the Schengen border between Poland and Ukraine?
What we have to expect is the fact that the transborder movement on Polish-Ukrainian frontier will diminish. We both agree that this is not desirable. Still we have to realize that to what an extent the movement will diminish at least partially depends on us so we have to do everything to maintain it as intensive as possible. Aiming at the maintenance of the open border would be unrealistic. Still Poland once becoming a member state of the Union and accepting the Schengen Agreement can promote some general solutions within the Union in favour of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Let us name those real aims to be achieved – the aims that Poland should promote:
· The inclusion of Ukraine to the list of the states the citizens of which do not need visas to enter the EU territory (that will be the aim maximum).
- This solution would have an additional positive impact on Ukraine since her citizenship would become more attractive as well for the Ukrainian Russians.
· The regulations enabling the Ukrainian citizens to participate in the so-called small transborder movement within the Schengen system (that will be the aim minimum).
- There are already existing experiences of such a solution on the Polish-German and Czech-German border. (Practically unguarded pedestrian and bicycle passages). This arrangement however would demand the changes in the present character of the borders of Ukraine with Russia and with Belarus. Poland can promote the solution by the virtue of which the European Union would be relatively opened for people movement on the territory reaching as far as eastern Ukrainian borders still not up to Vladyvostok. The maintenance of the present – opened and practically unguarded Ukrainian-Russian borders would exclude any possibility to successfully negotiate more liberal regime on Polish-Ukrainian ones. Ukraine cannot have both borders opened simultaneously. That choice is to be made sooner or later by the Ukrainian political class and we have to take it into consideration. We are aware the choice is not easy still it is inevitable.
· The further development of the transborder regional co-operation - The lack of a legal competency of the Ukrainian local authorities to take decisions results in the maintenance of the importance of the decisions taken on the inter-state level. This leads to the superiority of the governmental factor over the self-governmental one in mutual relations especially in the first stage of the foundation of the regional transborder co-operation structures
[8]. Having that reservation in mind we have to admit with pleasure that our regional co-operation is quite a promising enterprise now. There are two Euroregions established on Polish-Ukrainian border. Euroregion "Bug" and "Karpaty". The last is a multilateral structure involving Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania however the most dynamic co-operation exists between Poland and Ukraine and Ukraine and Hungary. This kind of activity shell be maintained and we all shell try to win the EU support for it.It would be false however to see the establishment of Schengen regime in a one sided way as troublemaker factor exclusively. It will bring some benefits as well as some loses. Let us name both kinds of the results of that development.
For Ukraine: It will be more difficult for the Ukrainian citizens to cross Polish border when Poland become the EU member state still those who will cross that border will be free to travel not only up to the River Odra but to the Atlantic Ocean to Lisbon. This is an example of what I have meant saying that Polish-Ukrainian relations will be less bilateral and more multilateral.
For Poland: The modernisation of border structures (especially the necessity to build new passes to amend the movement of people and goods) is the first range problem in the Polish-Ukrainian transborder co-operation. The other one is the efficient control of the common border effective enough to stop illegal migration and smuggling. In the Soviet period there existed the so-called sistiema - an integrated developed and very costly technical system of border control of the frontiers of the USSR. It was one of the characteristics of the totalitarian communist system and was de facto aimed at isolation of the Soviet citizens from the outside world. Poland was under Soviet domination so she did not guard the frontier in the east. Nobody has ever tried to escape from Poland to the USSR. In those circumstances Poland controlled Polish-Soviet border only in a symbolic way. The sistiema collapsed in 1991. In result the whole infrastructure of a real border control in the east had to be build almost from the beginning
[9]. Simultaneously as it has been pointed above Polish eastern borders became the first really guarded ones on the way from Pacific to Europe.To copy with the illegal migrations, international criminal activity and smuggling (in Polish – CIS case: drugs, radioactive materials, stolen cars, etc.) is the basic goal of the III-rd Pillar of the EU. The chance to stop all the mentioned pathologies on the eastern frontier of Poland instead of on the Polish-German border is one of the important reasons of the German support for the Polish membership in the Union. Motivated by the German national interest the FRG will probably inspire the investment of the EU in the modernisation and development of the Polish border infrastructure in the east. It may become a potential source of the European money for Poland resulting in an improvement of the control of the transborder movement of people and goods across the Polish-Ukrainian border and thus contribute to the development of the mutual co-operation
[10].For both: The future Polish-Ukrainian border will not be just the present German-Polish one moved to the East. No Poland neither Ukraine has enough money to invest in the partner country in the scale that would have any considerable impact on reality. Therefore we should consider the possibility to engage the European money to finance those enterprises that are in the interests of Poland and Ukraine as well as in the interests of the EU.
Apart of the economic aspect of the problem another dimension of the phenomenon is worth mentioning. Millions of Ukrainians who visit Poland every year undergo similar psychological process as the Poles did since 1970s. Relatively numerous (in comparison to the other soviet dominated states) visits of the Poles to the West enabled them to make comparisons and draw the conclusions. That fact contributed very much to the power and extent of the Polish opposition to the communism in the 1980s. There is an analogy to the importance of the maintenance of the "open door policy" for the people of the post-soviet area copying with the results of the 70 years self-isolation of the USSR. The position of Ukraine is the crucial one not only for Polish security but also for the European stabilisation. Therefore the occidentalisation of its public opinion is one of the most important and desirable process to be completed in the interest of Poland, Ukraine and Europe. Free transborder movement of people would be much more effective instrument of such an occidentalisation than all the conferences of the intellectuals put together.
3.1. Political adaptation for the European integration process
The process of Poland’s integration to the EU has become a subject of a permanent structural Polish-Ukrainian dialogue since 1999. Bronis³aw Geremek Polish foreign affairs minister presented the idea of Permanent Polish-Ukrainian Conference on the European Integration during his visit in Kyiv in September 1998. The body was created in March 1999 and charged with numerous tasks. So far the main field of its activity is Polish-Ukrainian co-operation in the harmonization of the Ukrainian law with the European standards. Poland shares with Ukraine Polish experience on the implementation of the acquis communautaire into the national juridical system as well as the conclusions derived from the financial and technical assistance of the EU to Poland. We all shell realize that under communist rule the law was created not as a real tool of the regulation of the public life. The relations between the state and citizens were shaped by the political will of the communist party and not by the law which had to some extent a merely ornamental character. Such a law is ineffective as an instrument of a modern democratic state and must be changed. Poland is obliged to adopt acquis communautaire to join the Union. Ukraine is not. We are all aware of all the reasons existing in Ukraine that may lead to the creation of the law different to that existing in the EU. Still the Ukrainian Parliament adopting new acts should know whether a given law is in accordance or not to the European one and if not the reasons for that should be known as well and should be reasonable. Polish experience in that field may be very useful.
3.2. EU external founds management and consumption
Both Poland and Ukraine are enjoying the financial assistance from the European Union. The main programs known as PHARE (Poland) and TACIS (Ukraine) may be used for common good. Poland however entering the Union will lose the PHARE resources that will be replaced by far more promising structural founds of the EU Regional Policy. Poland when being the EU member state will get the instrument to influence the decisions related to those money and should act in order to co-ordinate Polish-Ukrainian interests in that field. There is a lot to be done in the neighbouring regions of our two countries. Let me name just a few of the fields of potential Polish-Ukrainian co-operation: non-existing highway infrastructure that must be built
[11], ecological and environmental problems to be solved, tourism to be developed, supplied with infrastructure and promoted abroad. Truskavec, Kołomyia, Sianki and many other places used to be famous and splendid tourist centres before 1939. We shell make the effort to bring back their former role not only for the pleasure of the visitors but first of all we shell treat that task as a job creating action. Still first of all Poland and Ukraine should promote the investments of the EU money in the infrastructure of telecommunication, transport and energetic supply network.We need money for all those activities so we shell act in order to promote the reform of TACIS and some European structural founds in a way enabling us to use that money to finance common Polish-Ukrainian projects in the bordering territories. Those investments should be directed mainly to the Western Ukraine where their economic and political importance for Polish-Ukrainian neighbourhood would be much greater than in the east
[12]. I do hope such an action may be co-ordinate with Hungary and then, depending on the situation, with other candidate countries as Slovakia and Romania.3.3. Co-operation in the field of international security
Poland’s accession to the EU will not bring any fundamental changes in the system of hard security of the Polish state understood as the defence of Polish territory. It is NATO membership and not the EU one that determines that issue. Still the situation will be changed as far as the export of stabilization is concerned. The game for the final structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU is not over yet and it should be exploited in favour of Polish-Ukrainian interests.
First we shell realize that in spite of some proud statements of the European officials the CFSP is and in foreseeable future will remain the tool of common security (export of stabilisation) and not collective defence (territorial integrity of member states). The decisions taken by Helsinki European Council in December 1999 opened a new era in that field. The EU expressed her will to create the European Army of 60 000 men ready to be sent to action within 60 days since the decision on mobilisation and capable to be maintained in the field within the period of one year[13]. The problem is how to create an effective EU CFSP decision making structure without threatening the homogeneity of NATO. The EU wants the decisions to be taken exclusively by the EU members still it is obvious that it is the NATO military structure that will be in charge of their implementation. Considering that reality Polish government’s proposal on decision making body is based on the 15+6 principle. (15 EU member states and 6 European non-EU NATO members). The natural support of the non-EU NATO states allows us to expect the positive solution of that issue. This will give Poland a direct impact on the decisions taken by the EU within the scope of the CFSP, even before Polish accession to the Union.
Polish potential contribution to the NATO-EU out of area operation is ca. 1000-1500 soldiers[14]. In that context the Polish-Ukrainian military co-operation symbolized by Polish-Ukrainian battalion should be exploited in the interests of our both countries. Our common unit counts - 744 soldiers (378 from Polish 14th Armoured Brigade from Przemyśl and 366 from Ukrainian 310th mechanised regiment from Yavoriv)[15]. The battalion has been already included into the KFOR forces in Kosovo lately.
On June 8th 2000 in Yavoriv the commanders-in-chief of the Polish Army Forces and his Ukrainian colleague generals Zbigniew Zaleski and Piotr Szuliak signed a technical agreement on the principles of commanding, organization, deployment and tasks as well as the rules of financing of the national contingents of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion. That act was the final one of the process of the creation of the international legal base for the common action of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.
The agreement provided for the modification of the size of the national contingents within the battalion. Thy unit sent to Kosovo is constituted by 600 Polish soldiers from the mentioned 14 Armoured Brigade from Przemyśl and 280 Ukrainian soldiers from 24 „Iron" Division from Yavoriv.
In July the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion (POLUKRBAT) reassumed the tasks of Polish contingent in KFOR that had comprised the Ukrainian peacekeeping platoon and had been deployed in the American sector in Kosovo[16].
All those experiences allows to conclude that our forces put together may count ca. 2300 soldiers and would be outnumbered only by the British, French and possibly German contingents[17]. Of course not only men but the equipment counts in that calculation still an efficient efforts of Warsaw and Kyiv may give us the opportunity to promote Polish-Ukrainian military co-operation as an important part of the European capability for out of area operations within the scope of the Petersberg missions[18]. Therefore it is the urgent task for our both governments to:
1. Do their best to give the Polish-Ukrainian battalion a full operational capability as soon as possible;
2. Promote the Polish-Ukrainian military co-operation in the West showing Ukraine as a contributor of the European security and Poland as a champion of the effective co-operation on the security issues within the region;
3. Include Polish-Ukrainian battalion (using the precedents created by PfP, Kirchberg Declaration[19], IFOR, SFOR and KFOR) to the military operations of the EU should the European Union undertake any and exploit that fact politically[20];
4. Solve all the possible legal problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations constituting potential obstacles for the unit to react quickly in crisis situation. The battalion having 744 soldiers will be noticeable among the contingents of other states only in the first stage of operation, when the concentration of forces is poor. Any political benefits will be therefore possible only if our two states are able to act quickly[21];
5. Create a sufficient financial reserve for such operations in the budgets of our respective defence ministries.
3.4. Civil servants training
We both – the Poles and the Ukrainians, have to face, just as an existing reality, the fact that our states are far from being perfect structures. It appears that it is not the lack of a political will that constitute the main problem in our mutual relations still the lack of technical capability to implement the decisions taken on a political level. We should draw the conclusion from the Russian lesson and realize that one cannot govern the country changing the reality effectively with presidential decrees only. It is the problem of the quality of our political elite not on the top exclusively but first of all on the local level that is a decisive one in our mutual co-operation.
Poland and Ukraine after the decades of Soviet domination suffer from a lack of well-qualified professional civil servants especially the ones able to deal with the EU issues. That is both the problem of the central governmental administration as well as the regional one. It is a great task to be done to train a sufficient number of people for the administrative structures of Polish and Ukrainian states. Those structures have to be manned with a staff who would understand the rules governing in the EU and who would be able to participate in that "political game" in favour of our countries. Do not have the illusions that you can manage that process without well-trained professional personnel. That is a game. You can loose it if you do not know the rules. The training of the Polish civil servants is going on a full scale. Ukraine in order to manage the EU neighbourhood successfully has to do the same – she has to train her civil servants in the EU law, structures and political mechanisms governing that organism. I do believe Poland can be very helpful
as far as our training institutions are concerned. The European Institute in Łódź alone has organized more than 100 courses attended by 4 000 civil servants from central administration in the last few years. The new edition of the courses started last year and this time is addressed to local administration employees.3.5. Educational co-operation
Training of a skilful political class is connected with the education of young people. They will constitute the future staff of the state administration. Poland has benefited a lot from the EU programs of co-operation in that field – first TEMPUS and now ERASMUS–SOCRATES. Those programs comprise the exchange of students between the EU universities and the universities in the associated countries. Poland becoming a member state of the European Union will be able to promote the idea of extension of such a co-operation to Ukraine. It would be crucial for the future of our neighbourhood to have the Ukrainian elite educated in the European universities and to have a sufficient number of Polish and Western students having their personal experience of studying at the Ukrainian ones. This would help to promote both – Ukraine in the West and West in Ukraine. One should not treat this remark as rhetoric ornament. That issue will really shape our future.
In this context I am pleased to stress the fact that the idea of the creation of Polish-Ukrainian University has been met with a popular sympathy in Polish academic and political circles and I do hope such a University will be created within the few years to come
[22].General conclusions
The accession of Poland to the European Union will bring the following consequences for Polish-Ukrainian relations:
1. An acquirement of the institutional ability to influence the EU policy towards Ukraine by Poland;
2. More effective (since conducted within the III-rd Pillar of the EU) combat against international criminal activity;
3. The application of the European financial aid to modernise the infrastructure on the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands;
Our two countries should exploit this for:
1. Polish-Ukrainian political co-operation in the inclusion of Ukraine to the process of European integration;
2. Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation in the development of bordering regions of our countries first of all in the infrastructure of transport and communication, telecommunication energetic system and tourism;
3. Polish-Ukrainian military co-operation in the creation of the common component of the European projection of power capability;
4. Polish-Ukrainian co-operation in administrative staff training and academic education.
The process of the European integration creates a lot of chances still it may bring some menaces as well. They are as follows:
1. Weakening of the economic and interpersonal contacts with Ukraine resulting in a developing of a practical isolation of the ordinary Ukrainians from the contacts with the world other than the post-soviet one.
2. The aggravations of the social problems in those regions of Poland and Ukraine where the transborder trade played the important role in a creation of employment.
In general political terms Poland should work hard to avoid the impression that entering NATO and the EU she is leaving Ukraine or even is inclined to recognise it as a Russian zone of influence. I hope that the firm position of Polish government in the issue of the planned Russian gas pipeline outside Ukraine is the best prove that such fears are completely unfounded
[23].In the interest of Poland is:
1. The maintenance of the independence of Ukraine and the support of the West-oriented course in the foreign policy of that country accompanied with the inspiration of the EU institutions towards the development of the EU Ukrainian policy;
2. An access of Poland to the EU as the full member of the Union enjoying all the rights of the old members and shearing all their commitments with simultaneous maintenance of the "open door policy" for the contacts with Ukraine.